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I. INTRODUCTION
“Whiskey is for drinking, water is for fighting over.”1  But what
happens when the only opponent is the rightful owner?  With closing
notices in hand, Gerard Keating and his neighbors asked themselves
that same question.  The Nebraska Department of Natural Resources
issued  closing notices to Keating and many other appropriators in
Holt County, Nebraska, when stream flow in the Niobrara Watershed
had become insufficient to satisfy the water needs of all surrounding
appropriators.  Instead of taking advantage of the postdeprivation
hearing offered by the Department of Natural Resources, Keating and
the other appropriators filed suit, claiming that Nebraska’s estab-
lished water administration system violated their due process rights.2
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found no due process
violation of the appropriators’ rights, simply because the appropria-
tors do not have a property interest in the waters of the state, which
includes the Niobrara Watershed.3
1. Famously attributed to author Mark Twain, but never authenticated.
2. Keating v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist. (Keating IV), 660 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir.
2011); see U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (“[No State shall] deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
3. Keating IV, 660 F.3d at 1018.
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To clarify the arguments discussed in Keating, this Note first pro-
vides an overview of Nebraska water administration, followed by a
discussion of the property rights vested in public waters.  This Note
then analyzes the impracticality of predeprivation hearings for water
administration, the state’s interest in quick administration of water
use, and the challenge of providing sufficient due process while also
preserving the water administration system.
This Note then provides an overview of Keating and related case
law.  Thereafter, there is a discussion of the United States Supreme
Court decisions which have ruled that a predeprivation hearing is nec-
essary, and why those situations are inapplicable to the administra-
tion of water use.  This discussion also describes established
exceptions to the predeprivation hearing requirement and how Ne-
braska’s appropriation system does not violate due process.  Finally,
this Note concludes with how Keating’s and other similarly situated
plaintiffs’ challenges to the water administration system are a result
of misplaced expectations in appropriation permits and the minimal
property rights held therein.
II. NEBRASKA WATER LAW
Nebraska has a bifurcated system for the administration of its wa-
ters.  The doctrines of riparianism and prior appropriation simultane-
ously exist in Nebraska, though they are not without conflict.4  Each
system provides judicial redress if the user is deprived of the specific
rights she is allocated, and both systems are protected by the state.
This section discusses the two separate systems, the rights protected
within those systems, and how the state provides protection for such
rights.
A. Riparianism
Stemming from English common law, the doctrine of riparianism
grants landowners whose lands abut a body of water a right to the use
of the appurtenant water.5  A riparian right is “a usufruct, or a right
of use, in the stream as it passes by one’s land.”6  The common law
treated land and water as one entity that could not be separated.7
Riparianism is the main form of administration in states where water
4. See Spear T. Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 269 Neb. 177, 691 N.W.2d 116 (2005) (ruling
that groundwater users are generally not liable for interference with surface
water users).
5. RICHARD S. HARNSBERGER & NORMAN W. THORSON, NEBRASKA WATER LAW & AD-
MINISTRATION 20 (1984).
6. Id. at 24.
7. Id.
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is plentiful.8  In 1855, the state of Nebraska adopted the doctrine of
riparianism as its system of water administration.9
Landowners believing that they have a riparian right to use the
water must file a claim with the Nebraska Department of Natural Re-
sources (Department) in order to have that right recognized, and thus
gain its protection.10  Landowners claiming to have a riparian right to
use waters must prove that they had been using the water prior to the
enactment of the Irrigation Act11 for “actual and beneficial use,”12 and
the Director of the Department (Director) must also find the land-
owner’s use of the surface water is riparian in nature.13  The Depart-
ment may also “administer any riparian water right that has been
validated and recognized in a court order from a court of lawful juris-
diction in the state.”14
Having a solely riparian system, however, proved troublesome to
water users.15  One of the problems with riparianism was access to
water was uncertain.  The only users guaranteed access to water were
those who owned land adjacent to a water body.16  Riparianism also
proved to be an ineffective system for Nebraska because of the natural
ebb and flow of water.17  Riparian land could spontaneously be in-
creased by a depletion of water in the stream, or decreased by a rise in
stream flow.18  The system in place did not effectively distribute state
water resources, nor did it encourage efficient water usage.19  Fur-
ther, aggrieved riparians were only able to seek remedy against other
riparian users through lengthy and costly court proceedings.20
8. Id. at 19; Sean M. Hanlon, A Non-Indian Entity is Polluting Indian Waters:
“Water” Your Rights to the Waters, and “Water” Ya Gonna Do About It?, 69 MONT.
L. REV. 173, 183 (2008).
9. See 1855 Neb. Laws 328.
10. 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 14-001 (2005).
11. 1889 Neb. Laws 68; see infra note 23 and accompanying text.
12. 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 14-001; see also HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5,
at 24 (explaining that rights of a riparian nature are those that are derived from
a person’s land being appurtenant to a body of water).
13. See 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE, §§ 14-002–14-003.
14. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-226 (Supp. 2009).
15. Ralph J. Fischer, et al., Rights to Nebraska Streamflows: An Historical Overview
with Recommendations, 52 NEB. L. REV. 313, 339 (1973).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 324.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 339.
20. See id. at 353.
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B. From Riparianism to Prior Appropriation
Due to the uncertainty of a riparian right, the need for a more
structured system arose.21  Nebraska looked to other semi-arid re-
gions for guidance.22  In 1877, the Nebraska Legislature passed its
first irrigation law.23  The Act of 1877 allowed corporations to form for
the sole purpose of diverting water for irrigation and waterpower.24  It
also gave such organizations the right to “use eminent domain to ac-
quire necessary rights-of-way for canal construction.”25  The Legisla-
ture’s next major Act affecting water law came in 1889 with the
Raynor Irrigation Act.26  The Raynor Irrigation Act built upon the Act
of 1877 by increasing previously granted powers and instituting one of
the central tenants of the prior appropriation system: “first in time,
first in right.”27  Water rights could be granted to anyone who used
stream flow for a beneficial use.28  The right was not riparian, i.e.,
natural to the land, instead the right was a permit to appropriate un-
used water.29  Although the Department would not issue new riparian
rights,30 the Act protected existing rights.31
Nebraska officially adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation in
1895.32  The Act of 1895 declared that the only way in which a user
may obtain a water right is if the user applied for a right through the
state.33  Because the legislation was not retroactive, all users with an
established riparian water right maintained the use of their water
21. Id.  California did not use a riparian system, but instead had instituted a prior
appropriation system. Id. California’s system was developed through the mining
industry in which miners periodically met to establish each miner’s water right.
Id. The first miner to take a quantity of water had a right to that water solely
because he was the first to divert it; ownership of land was no longer a require-
ment for the access to water. Id. While this was originally a practice only among
miners, California eventually adopted prior appropriation as the official water
administration system of the state. Id. Nebraska’s Supreme Court also recog-
nized the need for a new system. Id. The court found that it was “the policy of
the law in all the arid states and territories to require and enforce an economical
use of the waters of the natural streams.” Id. It further held that efficient and
beneficial use of the state’s waters was one of “urgent” necessity. Id.
22. Id. at 340.
23. HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5, at 64 (citing 1877 Neb. Laws 168).
24. Id.
25. Fischer, supra note 15, at 333 (explaining how the Nebraska Legislature declared
the construction of a canal to be “a work of internal improvement” in order to
grant corporations the right to eminent domain).
26. HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5, at 64 (citing 1889 Neb. Laws 503).
27. Id. at 65.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 65–66.
30. Id. at 65.
31. HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5, at 65 (citing 1889 Neb. Laws 503–04).
32. Id. (citing 1895 Neb. Laws 244–69).
33. 1895 Neb. Laws 244–69.
742 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:737
right so long as it was put to beneficial use.34  The Act declared all
waters not yet in use to be “unappropriated” and property of the pub-
lic, and thus available for an appropriation of beneficial use.35  In
other words, the result of the Act of 1895 was that any riparian user
maintained his or her right, but all users subsequent to 1895 could
only receive an appropriation for water; no new riparian rights could
be established.
These coexisting systems have created “confusion in administra-
tive and judicial attempts to reconcile these fundamentally opposed
doctrines.”36  When conflicts arise between riparian users, courts
struggle to find a proper resolution.37  Riparian rights are inherently
“allusive” and “can befuddle the most diligent attempts to adjudicate
conflicting claims.”38  This struggle within the court systems is one of
the many reasons that the prior appropriation system was more effec-
tive for Nebraska’s water administration.  The riparian system “had
not provided a method for achieving an efficient allocation of re-
sources.”39  As compared to imprecise riparian rights, “intra-appropri-
ator disputes have been settled easily due to the certainty of who are
appropriators, what right each has in relationship to others on the
same stream, and when and where each is entitled to water.”40  In
comparison to the riparian rights system, the prior appropriation sys-
tem is a “sophisticated administrative mechanism.”41  Prior appropri-
ation also allows for more effective remedies for aggrieved
appropriators.42  While riparians had to rely on court proceedings to
remedy a situation, the move to a prior appropriation system was a
move to state-enforced water rights.43
C. Prior Appropriation: The Doctrine of Scarcity44
An appropriation is a “permit to use water that has been perfected
in accordance with terms stipulated by the Department.”45  Only land-
owners who intend to divert water from a stream, reservoir, or lake for
any of a variety of uses—i.e. impounding water, use of impounded
water, use of a stream’s natural flow, intentionally storing ground
water, recovering intentionally stored ground water, using instream
34. Id. (citing 1895 Neb. Laws 260).
35. Id.
36. Fischer, supra note 15, at 324.
37. Id. at 325.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 338–39.
40. Id. at 325.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 353.
43. Id.
44. HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5, at 19.
45. 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 1-001 (2005).
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flow, recharging ground water, or general power uses46—can apply for
a permit.47
A person seeking an appropriation must apply to the Department
in order to receive a permit.48  The Director may decide a hearing is
necessary to determine whether the appropriation is in the best inter-
ests of the public.49  One of the factors in the Director’s determina-
tion50 is whether a body of water is fully or overappropriated.51
1. Fully, Under, and Overappropriated
A fully appropriated body of water is one in which the Department
has determined that the surface water will be “insufficient to sustain
over the long term the beneficial or useful purposes” for which permits
have already been granted.52  A body of water can also be designated
as fully appropriated if the stream flow would be insufficient to sus-
tain any aquifer wells that depend on the natural flow for recharge.53
It can also be fully appropriated if increased stream flow depletion
(water shortage) would cause Nebraska to be out of compliance “with
an interstate compact or decree, other formal state contract or agree-
ment, or applicable state or federal laws,” which dictate how much
water the state is responsible for delivering to other states.54  Another
method the Department uses to determine whether a body of water is
fully appropriated is a method known as the “65/86 Rule.”55  This
method determines
46. Id. § 2-001.01.
47. See id. §§ 1-001, 1-004, 2-001.05.
48. See id. § 18-001 (mandating that applications include (1) a study conducted by
the Game and Parks Commission or any relevant Natural Resources District that
quantifies in-stream flow needs; (2) a United States Geological Survey topo-
graphic map of the stream reach in question; (3) evidence that there is unappro-
priated water available and how—if the application was granted—the
appropriation would affect existing appropriators; and (4) an evaluation of how
the application would be in the best interests of the public).
49. Id. at § 18-004; see also City of Fairbury v. Fairbury Mill & Elevator Co., 123 Neb.
588, 243 N.W. 774 (1932) (holding the Department has authority to grant appro-
priations as long as the appropriation does not adversely affect existing appropri-
ations or riparian users).
50. For such determinations, the Director and the Department use “the best scien-
tific data and information,” including surface water administrative records, De-
partment Hydrographic Reports, Department and United States Geologic Survey
stream gage records, Department’s registered wells database, water level records
and maps, ground water models, and current rules and regulations of the Natural
Resources Districts.  457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 24-002; see NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-
713 (Reissue 2004).
51. 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 24-001.
52. Id.; see NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-713(3)(a).
53. 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 24-001; see NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-713(3)(b).
54. 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 24-001 see; NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-713(3)(c).
55. See generally 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 24-001.01A.
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whether the most junior surface water appropriator can divert sufficient
water to satisfy two different standards: (1) 65 percent of the Department’s
calculated annual corn irrigation requirement from July 1 through August 31
and (2) 85 percent of the Department’s calculated annual corn irrigation re-
quirement from May 1 through September 30.56
The Department will declare a body of water fully appropriated if the
appropriator with the latest priority date, i.e., the most junior appro-
priator,57 failed either of the two standards.58  The under and overap-
propriated distinctions are the determinations on either side of the
“fully” appropriated status.
It is important to note that not all appropriations are permanent.
The Department has the authority to grant a temporary use permit.59
When a user needs access to water for a limited time, he or she may
apply for a temporary use permit through the Department.60  A grant
of this permit “does not grant access to the surface water source and
does not provide a permanent water right.”61
2. Priority Dates
If the Department approves an application for any type of appro-
priation, whether temporary or permanent, the applicant (now an ap-
propriator) is given a permit with a priority date.62  Once approved,
priority dates are retroactive to the date the applicant filed the appli-
cation.63  Due to this chronological application system, there are “se-
nior appropriators” and “junior appropriators.”64  A “senior
appropriator” is an appropriator with an earlier priority date than an-
other appropriator.65  A “junior appropriator” is any appropriator that
has a later priority date than the appropriator in question.66
Priority dates are crucial to the effectiveness of Nebraska’s prior
appropriation system.  They are also inherently valuable.  An earlier
appropriation date is superior to that of a later appropriation date.67
Moreover, an appropriation permit for water use attaches to the prop-
erty that is specified on the application,68 and the original priority
56. Middle Niobrara Natural Res. Dist. v. Dept. of Natural Res., 281 Neb. 634, 649,
799 N.W.2d 305, 317 (2011); see generally 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 24-001.01A.
57. See infra subsection II.C.ii.
58. Middle Niobrara, 281 Neb. at 649, 799 N.W.2d at 317.
59. 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE §§ 20-001, 20-004 (2005).
60. Id. § 20-001–20-002.
61. Id. § 20-001.
62. HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5, at 74.
63. Id.
64. Bond v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist. (Bond I), 278 Neb. 137, 139, 768 N.W.2d 420, 422
(2009).
65. Id. at 139, 768 N.W.2d at 423.
66. Id. at 139, 768 N.W.2d at 423.
67. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-203 (Cum. Supp. 1929).
68. Farmers’ Canal Co. v. Frank, 72 Neb. 136, 100 N.W. 286 (1904).
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date will remain with the land even in the event of a change of owner-
ship.69  In the case of stream flow depletion, a junior appropriator will
be issued a closing notice before a senior appropriator.70  Because of
this, land of a senior appropriator is more valuable than land of a jun-
ior appropriator.
3. Calls
In order for an appropriator to exercise his or her priority, or con-
stitutional preference, an appropriator must place a “call.”71  A call is
made when “an appropriator with an earlier-in-time right to use the
water [requests] that the Department close the rights to divert water
belonging to junior appropriators upstream of the senior appropria-
tor.”72  To “close the rights to divert water,” the Department issues a
“closing notice.”73  When determining if a call is necessary, the De-
partment considers whether the body of water in question is under,
fully, or overappropriated.74
D. Closing Notices
If it finds there is “insufficient water for all appropriations,” the
Department will issue a closing notice.75  This notice instructs junior
appropriators “to cease water diversions” issued in their permit.76
This “increases the stream flow to satisfy the senior appropriator’s
right to divert water.”77  The Nebraska Legislature has granted the
Department the authority to make final decisions, such as issuing
closing notices, without first holding a hearing.78  Aggrieved parties,
however, are not without redress: “If a final decision is made without a
hearing, a hearing shall be held at the request of any party to the
proceeding.”79  Under the rules and regulations of the Department, an
aggrieved appropriator may file a petition for a declaratory order, or
request a contested case hearing.80
69. Change of ownership of an appropriation is governed by 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE
§ 4.001 (2005).
70. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-203.
71. Middle Niobrara Natural Res. Dist. v. Dep’t. of Natural Res., 281 Neb. 634, 636,
799 N.W.2d 305, 309 (2011).
72. Id. at 636, 799 N.W.2d at 309.
73. Id. at 636, 799 N.W.2d at 309; see infra section II.E.
74. 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 24; see supra subsection II.C.i.
75. Bond I, 278 Neb. 137, 141, 768 N.W.2d 420, 424 (2009).
76. Id. at 141, 768 N.W.2d at 424.
77. Middle Niobrara, 281 Neb. at 636, 799 N.W.2d at 309.
78. NEB. REV. STAT. § 61-206(1) (Reissue 2008).
79. Id.
80. 454 NEB. ADMIN. CODE §§ 6–7 (2005).
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1. Declaratory Orders
A petition for a declaratory order “may be requested on the applica-
bility of a statute, rule, regulation, or order enforced by the [Depart-
ment].”81  “Applicability” is defined as “the appropriateness of the
relation of the law to the person, property, or state of facts, or its rele-
vance under the circumstances given.”82  However, a declaratory or-
der issued by a hearing officer is not to be used to issue judgment on
the effect of the Department’s conduct.83  For that challenge, when the
Department issues a closing notice, the affected appropriator—usu-
ally one with a junior priority date—may request a hearing.84  These
hearings are commonly referred to as “postdeprivation” hearings be-
cause they occur after the junior appropriator has been ordered to
cease using water.
2. Contested Case Hearings (Postdeprivation Hearings)
The procedure commonly referred to as a “postdeprivation” hearing
is officially known as a “contested case hearing.”85  A contested case
hearing is “a proceeding before the Agency in which the legal rights,
duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitu-
tional right to be determined after an Agency hearing.”86  This pro-
ceeding is commenced when an appropriator files an “objection,
complaint, or response” to an order made by the Department.87  An
appropriator can file a contested case hearing at any time the appro-
priator believes that departmental action has aggrieved one of their
rights.88  It is referred to as a postdeprivation hearing when the De-
partment receives a petition for a contested case hearing after an ap-
propriator has been issued a closing notice.89
The procedure for a postdeprivation/contested case hearing is simi-
lar to the procedures followed in the court system.  Prehearing mo-
tions and conferences are permitted, as is discovery and amendments
to the pleadings.90  During the hearing, parties have the option of
making an opening statement, presenting evidence and rebuttal evi-
dence, examining witnesses, and giving a closing argument.91  At the
conclusion of a contested case, the hearing officer will issue a deci-
81. Id. § 6-003.03.
82. Id.
83. Id. § 6-003.03B.
84. 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 14-001.
85. 454 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 7-001.01.
86. Id.
87. Id. § 7-005.01.
88. Id.
89. Id. § 7-001.01.
90. Id. § 7-007.
91. Id.
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sion.92  When making a decision, the hearing officer must consider the
“findings of fact”93 and “applications of the controlling law to the facts
found.”94  A party receiving an adverse decision may file for a rehear-
ing95 or appeal to the Nebraska Court of Appeals.96
At the close of a contested case hearing, the designated hearing
officer will come to a legal conclusion by applying the controlling law,
and issue an order specifying the legal ramifications of her conclu-
sions.97  The order will also include whatever action the Department
has taken as a result of the hearing officer’s conclusions.98  An order
resulting from a contested case hearing will normally either affirm or
overturn an order made by the Department that a party believes has
aggrieved his constitutional or statutory rights.99
E. Constitutional Preference
Under Nebraska’s constitution, water used domestically or for irri-
gation is a “natural want.”100  The Supreme Court of Nebraska has
defined a “natural want” to be “one absolutely necessary to human
existence.”101  Nebraska’s conservation and control of water therefore
satisfies a valid public purpose by preserving a resource necessary to
human existence.102  Accordingly, Nebraska’s constitution gives its
citizens the rights to use water, but only if the waters are used benefi-
cially.103  In other words, Nebraska’s citizens have a right to use the
state’s waters and the state serves a valid public purpose when it reg-
ulates the use thereof.
The state’s constitution also provides a list of preferred uses of
water, and which use will supersede the other in times of water scar-
city.104  The preference system “has the purpose of adjusting supply
between users possession water rights under the [appropriation] sys-
tem.”105  Article XV, § 6 of the constitution requires that users of
water for domestic purposes be given preference over agricultural pur-
poses, regardless of priority date.106  Agricultural users, in turn, have
92. Id. § 7-009.01.
93. Id. § 7-009.02D.
94. Id. § 7-009.02E.
95. Id. § 7-010.01.
96. Id. § 7-010.03.
97. Id. § 7-009.02.
98. Id.
99. Id. § 7-001.01.
100. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 4.
101. Neb. Mid-State Reclamation Dist. v. Hall Cnty., 152 Neb. 410, 436, 41 N.W.2d
397, 413 (1950).
102. Id. at 436, 41 N.W.2d at 413.
103. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 5.
104. Id. § 6.
105. Fischer, supra note 15, at 329.
106. Id. at 328.
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preference over manufacturing or power users.107  However, “no infer-
ior right to the use of the water . . . shall be acquired by a superior
right without just compensation therefore to the inferior user.”108
Consequently, according to the constitutional preferences, domestic
users are superior users when compared to agricultural users, and ag-
ricultural users are superior when compared to manufacturing
users.109  But, when exercising constitutional preference, junior ap-
propriators (with senior preference under the constitution) must give
just compensation110 to senior appropriators (with junior preference
under the constitution).111
F. Property Right in Water
1. Junior Appropriators Do Not Have a Strong Property Right
Appropriators do not have a strong property right to water as a
result of their appropriation.  In Frenchman Valley Irrigation District
v. Smith,112 landowners objected to a contract between an irrigation
district and the United States for the purchase of a water supply.113
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that “the appropriator of the wa-
ters of a stream acquires a right to the use of such water.”114  It also
ruled that such an appropriator does not acquire ownership of the
water he is permitted to use.115  In City of Fairbury v. Fairbury Mill &
Elevator Co.,116 the Nebraska Supreme Court heard an appeal from a
Department of Public Works117 decision that permitted the city to
build diversions and obstructions in the Little Blue River.118  It again
held that the defendant did not own the “water of the stream, for it is
the general rule that such water is not the subject of private owner-
ship.”119  A right may be acquired for its use, which will be regarded
as a property right, but the right carries no specific property in the
water.120
107. Id.
108. Id. at 328 n.57.
109. NEB. CONST. art. XV, §§ 5–6.
110. See Loup River Pub. Power Dist. v. N. Loup River Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist.,
142 Neb. 141, 5 N.W.2d 240 (1942).
111. NEB. CONST. art. XV, §§ 5–6.
112. Frenchman Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Smith, 167 Neb. 78, 91 N.W.2d 415 (1958).
113. Id., 91 N.W.2d 415.
114. Id. at 99, 91 N.W.2d at 428.
115. Id. at 99, 91 N.W.2d at 428.
116. City of Fairbury v. Fairbury Mill & Elevator Co., 123 Neb. 588, 243 N.W. 774
(1932).
117. Now the Department of Natural Resources as per 1999 Neb. Laws 900.
118. Fairbury, 123 Neb. at 588, 243 N.W. at 774.
119. Id. at 588, 243 N.W. at 774.
120. Id. at 588, 243 N.W. at 774.
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Northport Irrigation District v. Jess121 is yet another case in which
the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that appropriators do not
have a property right in the water itself.  In Northport, an irrigation
district petitioned to enjoin the Department of Water Resources122
from forcing the district to have a permit before it could pump water
from Upper Dugout Creek.123  Citing the Supreme Court of Montana,
the court found:
The corpus of running water in a natural stream is not the subject of private
ownership.  “Such water is classed with light and the air in the atmosphere.
It is publici juris or belongs to the public.  A usufructuary right or right to use
it exists, and the corpus of any portion taken from the stream and reduced to
possession is private property so long only as the possession continues.”124
Thus, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has clearly declared water to be
immune to ownership, just as air and light have been.
One of the cornerstone cases for Nebraska water law is Spear T.
Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub.125  In that case, a surface water appropriator
brought appropriation, conversion, and trespass actions against
groundwater users because they were affecting the flow of the surface
water.126  This case is considered a cornerstone because it distin-
guished liability of groundwater users from that of surface water
users.127  It held that a groundwater user could not be liable for inter-
fering with surface water users unless her use had a “direct and sub-
stantial effect”128 upon a body of water and caused an unreasonable
amount of harm to the surface water user.129  For purposes of this
Note, another important aspect of Spear T. was the declaration of the
court that “[a] right to appropriate surface water however, is not an
ownership of property.  Instead, the water is viewed as a public want
and the appropriation is a right to use the water.”130
2. Only the Right to Use
There is some property right, however, in a water appropriation,
albeit not an ownership right in the water.  The Supreme Court of Ne-
braska has recognized that an appropriation, “whether for irrigation
or for power purposes, is a property right which is entitled to the same
121. Northport Irrigation Dist. v. Jess, 215 Neb. 152, 337 N.W.2d 733 (1983).
122. Now the Department of Natural Resources as per 1999 Neb. Laws 900.
123. Northport Irrigation, 215 Neb. at 153, 337 N.W.2d at 736.
124. Id. at 158, 337 N.W.2d at 738 (quoting Rock Creek Ditch Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d
1074, 1076 (D. Mont. 1933)).
125. Spear T. Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 269 Neb. 177, 691 N.W.2d 116 (2005).
126. Id. at 181, 691 N.W.2d at 124.
127. Donald Blankenau, Nebraska Court Adopts Tort Liability for Groundwater Users,
36 NO. 6 ABA TRENDS 4, 4 (2005).
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR USE OF GROUND WATER § 858
(1979).
129. Spear, 269 Neb. at 191, 691 N.W.2d at 132.
130. Id. at 185, 691 N.W.2d at 127.
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protection as any other property right.”131  It  has stated that an ap-
propriator who follows applicable statutory requirements (i.e. priority
and preference) has a vested property right.132  It has also held that
“[t]he appropriator of water of a stream does not acquire ownership of
such water,” but only the right to use the water.133
But the vested property right of an appropriator is also subject to
the state’s police power.134  The Supreme Court of Nebraska has held
that, despite a vested property right, “[t]he adjudication of the water
right gave to [an appropriator] a vested right to the use of the waters
appropriated, subject to the law at the time the vested interest was
acquired and such reasonable regulations subsequently adopted by
virtue of the police power of the State.”135  As such, it is accepted law
of Nebraska that the “right to prescribe the manner of using the wa-
ters of the state and apportioning the use among the people of the
state rests with the Legislature, and is a proper exercise of its general
police powers.”136
While appropriators may have a property right to the use of water,
the right to use has been limited.  Although the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska has held that an appropriator’s right to use the water is pro-
tected once it has been vested,137 this right is limited by “the rights of
all prior and subsequent appropriators, and he cannot infringe upon
their rights and privileges.”138  An appropriator also may not use his
or her vested property right to the extent that it injures a senior
appropriator.139
III. INTRO TO KEATING
This Note examines the interaction of due process and Nebraska’s
water administration as challenged in Keating v. Nebraska Public
131. Loup River Pub. Power Dist. v. N. Loup River Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 142
Neb. 141, 152, 5 N.W.2d 240, 248 (1942).
132. Enter. Irrigation Dist. v. Willis, 135 Neb. 827, 284 N.W. 236, 329 (1939); see gen-
erally City of Fairbury v. Fairbury Mill & Elevator Co., 123 Neb. 588, 243 N.W.
774 (1932); Nine Mile Irrigation Dist. v. State, 118 Neb. 522, 225 N.W. 679
(1929); In re Kearney Water & Elec. Powers Co., 97 Neb. 139, 149 N.W. 363
(1914); Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903).
133. Frenchman Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Smith, 167 Neb. 78, 99, 91 N.W.2d 415, 428
(1958).
134. See State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 163, 292 N.W. 239, 244 (1940) (“[T]he
state in the exercise of its police power may supervise and control the appropria-
tion, diversion and distribution of the public waters of the state, and impose that
duty upon administrative officers, is well settled.”).
135. In re Birdwood Irrigation Dist., 154 Neb. 52, 55, 46 N.W.2d 884, 887 (1951).
136. Farmers’ Irrigation Dist. v. Frank, 72 Neb. 136, 100 N.W. 286, 294 (1904).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Northport Irrigation Dist. v. Jess, 215 Neb. 152, 159, 337 N.W.2d 733, 738 (1983).
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Power District.140  In Keating, the Nebraska Public Power District
(NPPD) held three surface water appropriation permits that allowed
NPPD to appropriate a total of 2,035 cubic feet per second of water for
Spencer Dam, located in the Niobrara Watershed.141  The plaintiffs
were farmers and ranchers that owned and rented land within the
watershed.142  NPPD had an appropriation senior to the plaintiffs’,143
and began experiencing stream water depletion.144  On March 2,
2007, NPPD placed a continuing call145 on the Niobrara River for
Spencer Dam.146  The Department investigated the stream flow deple-
tions, and determined that NPPD could beneficially use the full
amount of water to which it had the right to use and that the Niobrara
River’s stream flow was adequate to fulfill NPPD’s appropriations.147
Because the Department found the stream flow was sufficient, it de-
termined a call was unnecessary and declined to send out closing
notices.148
Despite finding NPPD’s request for a call unnecessary, the Depart-
ment sent “regulating notices” to upstream proprietors.149  The regu-
lating notices simply informed appropriators of the specifications of
their individual appropriations and prohibited them from exceeding
the limits permitted therein.150  However, by April 2007, the Niobrara
River’s stream flow was depleted, and the Department sent closing
notices151 to all of the upstream appropriators with a junior priority
date to NPPD.152  The plaintiffs, Gerard Keating and fellow appropri-
ators, were among those that received both the regulating notices and
the closing notices.153  A week later, the Department determined that
stream flow had been adequately restored and issued opening no-
140. Keating I, No. 7:07CV5011, 2007 WL 2248054 (D. Neb. Aug. 1, 2007).
141. Keating v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist. (Keating III), 713 F. Supp.2d 849, 853 (D. Neb.
2010).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See supra section II.D.
146. Keating III, 713 F.Supp.2d at 854.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See supra section II.E.
152. Keating III, 713 F. Supp.2d at 854.
153. Id. at 854–55.
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tices154 to the plaintiffs.155  But, the Department reissued the closing
notices three months later.156
A. Procedural History
The plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court alleging that NPPD
and the Department (defendants) had violated their rights157 by exer-
cising priority over them, thus taking their water.158  The plaintiffs
also claimed that the Department violated their rights by issuing clos-
ing notices without prior notice or a hearing.159  The court, however,
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim,160 finding it not yet ripe as there were
no closing notices in effect at the time of the case and the last closing
notices issued had been lifted.161  It further ruled that the claim was
not ripe because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies available to them through the Department.162  The claim
was therefore dismissed because “[t]he administrative procedures
clearly provided plaintiffs with a process to challenge and review the
actions of [the Department] in issuing the subject closing notices,” and
the plaintiffs had failed to take advantage of such procedures.163  In
other words, because the plaintiffs did not petition for a declaratory
order or request a contested case hearing, the district court dismissed
the claim.164
1. First Appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals,165 which overturned the district court’s holding
that the plaintiffs’ claim was not yet ripe.166  Because there were no
notices in place at the time, and therefore there was no live contro-
versy over closing notices, it determined the issue was mootness, not
ripeness.167  The issue of mootness, however, contains an exception
based on the facts that are “capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-re-
154. An opening notice is the inverse of a closing notice. See supra section II.E.  By
logical extension, an opening notice is issued to appropriators that previously re-
ceiving closing notices, notifying them that stream flow has reached a level which
permits them to resume diversions.
155. Keating III, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 855.
156. Id. (noting that opening notices have since been issued).
157. Keating I, No. 7:07CV5011, 2007 WL 2248054, at *1 (D. Neb. August 1, 2007).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *2.
164. See supra subsections II.E.i–ii.
165. Keating v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist. (Keating II), 562 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2009).
166. Id. at 927.
167. Id.
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view.”168  This exception applies when “(1) the challenged action [is] in
its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expira-
tion, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same com-
plaining party [will] be subject to the same action again.”169
Because the issued closing notices were only in effect for a short
period of time, the Eighth Circuit held the “capable-of-repetition-yet-
evading-review” exception applied and found the claim was not
moot.170  The court also found that it was not necessary to exhaust all
available administrative remedies before bringing suit for any
“postdeprivation remedies when the litigant contends that he was en-
titled to predeprivation process.”171  The court remanded the case
back to the district court to determine whether the plaintiffs had been
deprived of their property, whether that property right required a
predeprivation hearing, and whether a predeprivation declaratory or-
der would be a constitutionally adequate protection.172
2. Remanded to the District Court of Nebraska
On remand, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for sum-
mary judgment and granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.173  In deciding the first issue—whether a deprivation of a
property right had occurred—the court looked to established Ne-
braska case law and found that it was “clear the plaintiffs do not hold
any right in the waters of the Niobrara River prior to capture” because
the Nebraska Supreme Court had repeatedly stated the holder of a
surface water appropriation permit “does not acquire ownership of
stream water prior to capture, as that water is public property.”174  It
also ruled that the right was a right to “their place on the priority list”
and not to the physical water.175  Thus, the district court found the
plaintiffs only property right was the use of the water.176
The second issue remanded was whether deprivation of the prop-
erty right claimed by the plaintiffs was entitled to a predeprivation
hearing.177  The court answered this question with a resounding
168. Id.
169. Id. (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 929; see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (holding that if a State
can practicably provide a predeprivation hearing, then it is required to so even if
a postdeprivation hearing would have been adequate).
172. Keating II, 562 F.3d at 930.
173. Keating III, 713 F. Supp. 2d 849 (D. Neb. 2010).
174. Id. at 857.
175. Id. at 858.
176. Id. (“[T]he prior rights of all persons who, by compliance with the laws of the
State of Nebraska, have acquired the right to use the waters of the natural
streams of the state must not be interfered with by the use of water under this
permit.”).
177. Keating II, 562 F.3d 923, 930 (8th Cir. 2009).
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“no.”178  Because they had appropriation permits and the correspond-
ing placement on the priority list—with their rights to the same
amount of water preserved—the court ruled that the Department had
not sought to deprive plaintiffs of their property rights.179  The plain-
tiffs’ property rights were not in the water itself, but in the “ability to
exercise their senior preference rights.”180  Thus, the court found that
there is no deprivation of a property right when the actions of the De-
partment are within the scope of its police power: to protect the integ-
rity of the appropriation system by enforcing priority dates and
preference rights.
3. Back From the Eighth Circuit
The plaintiffs again appealed to the Eighth Circuit.181  As the case
stood before it, the Eighth Circuit had two options: it could rule that a
predeprivation hearing was required before the Department could is-
sue a closing notice, or it could affirm the district court’s latest deci-
sion and hold that a postdeprivation hearing is sufficient.  On
November 7, 2011, it affirmed the district court’s decision, ruling that
a postdeprivation hearing is sufficient to satisfy an appropriator’s
right to due process.182  The Eighth Circuit evaluated the property
rights at issue and rightly decided the case by ruling that a
predeprivation hearing was unnecessary.183
IV. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT A
PREDEPRIVATION HEARING WAS UNNECESSARY
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court and rightly ruled
that a predeprivation hearing is unnecessary.184  The decision in
Keating is a critical one: the plaintiffs in the case are not the only
plaintiffs to challenge the Department’s administrative procedures.
Shortly behind Keating was a challenge by junior appropriators of a
senior appropriation held by the Nebraska Public Power District in
Bond v. Nebraska Public Power District.185 Bond had substantively
the same arguments; however, the plaintiffs brought their claim in
178. Keating III, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 858.
179. Id. at 858–59.
180. Id. at 859.
181. Keating IV, 660 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2011).
182. Id. at 1018 (citing Idaho Dept. of Water Res. Amended Final Order Creating
Water Dist. No. 170, 220 P.3d 318, 331–32 (Idaho 2009)) (“A water user has no
property interest in being free from the State’s regulation of water distribution in
accordance with the prior appropriation doctrine . . . .”).
183. Id. at 1016.
184. Id.
185. 278 Neb. 137, 768 N.W.2d 420 (2009).
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state court, as opposed to Keating’s claims that were brought in
federal.186
In Bond, junior appropriators challenged “the interplay of prefer-
ence rights and appropriation rights.”187  NPPD argued that the ap-
propriators could not challenge the validity of its appropriation right
because prior condemnation hearings, albeit with different appropria-
tors, had mooted the condemnation proceedings brought by the plain-
tiff, Bond.188  The Director had agreed in departmental proceedings
and rendered the proceedings moot.189  Bond appealed to the Supreme
Court of Nebraska which held the proceedings were not moot because
state statutes do not require a junior appropriator to choose between
condemnation proceedings—asserting his superior preference right—
and challenging the validity of the senior appropriation right in order
to maintain access to the water.190  The court stated that “to hold that
junior appropriators must choose between these procedures would
force them into the precarious position of relinquishing their prefer-
ence rights.”191  As a result, it remanded the case back to the Director
for further proceedings.192
On remand, Bond challenged the sufficiency of the closing notices
issued and “sought a determination of the validity of NPPD’s water
appropriations on the bases that NPPD had abandoned or statutorily
forfeited all or a portion of its appropriations.”193  If the court deter-
mined that NPPD had abandoned or statutorily forfeited any portion
of its appropriations, there would be no “legally sufficient foundation
for the closing notices.”194  The Director denied Bond’s challenge to
the validity of NPPD’s appropriations and Bond appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska.  The court determined the Department
erred in refusing to determine the validity of NPPD’s appropriations
and remanded the case back to the Department to determine “whether
NPPD’s appropriations have been abandoned or statutorily forfeited
in whole or in part.”195  However, NPPD filed a motion for rehearing
with the supreme court.
NPPD stated that the court is “obligated to dispose of cases on the
basis of the theory presented by the pleadings on which the case was
186. Id., 768 N.W.2d 420.
187. Id. at 138, 768 N.W.2d at 422.
188. Id. at 136, 768 N.W.2d at 420.
189. Id. at 136, 768 N.W.2d at 420.
190. Id. at 148, 768 N.W.2d at 428.
191. Id. at 148, 768 N.W.2d at 428.
192. Id. at 137, 768 N.W.2d at 420.
193. Bond v. Nebraska Public Power District (Bond II), 283 Neb. 629, 637, 820 N.W.2d
44 (2012).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 658, 820 N.W.2d at 67.
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tried.”196  The motion asserted that because the issues of abandon-
ment and statutory forfeiture were “integral parts of the case at all
stages,” the court must decide the case based on those issues.197
Through its motion, NPPD was trying to force the court to determine
that its appropriations remain valid.  By forcing the court’s hand,
NPPD seemed to be attempting to avoid any further litigation regard-
ing the manner by which the waters of Nebraska are administered
and therefore lay to rest the issue it has been litigating for the past
decade in both Keating and Bond. The court has since denied the mo-
tion for rehearing and the case is now before the Department once
again.198
After the second remand, Bond has still not been decided on its
ultimate issue.  The Supreme Court of Nebraska must eventually de-
termine whether the current appropriation system is effective and
whether the rights afforded to junior appropriators satisfy the re-
quirements of due process to protect the minimal property rights an
appropriator holds in her water right.  While the facts differ from
Keating, the threat from an adverse decision in Bond is the same: if
the Supreme Court of Nebraska rules in favor of the junior appropria-
tors and overturns the preference system, the Department will be
forced to create an entirely new system.
A. A Finding that a Predeprivation Hearing Is Necessary
Would Be Wrong for Three Reasons
1. Not a Strong Enough Property Right
Property rights were the main issue in Keating.  It is important for
all future decisions to adhere to the Eighth Circuit’s decision that the
Department’s procedures sufficiently protect the plaintiff’s minimal
property rights.  Indeed, future plaintiffs will have an appropriation
that only gives them a right to use the water that is specifically identi-
fied in their permit.199  The Supreme Court of Nebraska has consist-
ently ruled that appropriators have no ownership in the body of water
from which they divert and thus are not protected by due process.200
In fact, Nebraska’s constitution explicitly declares that the state’s wa-
ters are owned by the public.201  The plaintiffs in Keating argued their
196. Motion for Rehearing & Memorandum Brief at 7, Bond II, 283 Neb. 629, 820
N.W.2d 44, No. S11–006 (citing Ashland State Bank v. Elkhorn Racquetball, Inc.,
246 Neb. 411, 419, 520 N.W.2d 189, 194 (1994)).
197. Id.
198. Order Overruling Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing, Bond II, 283 Neb. 629, 820
N.W.2d 44 (2012).
199. Frenchman Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Smith, 167 Neb. 78, 91 N.W.2d 415 (1958).
200. Id. at 99, 91 N.W.2d at 428.
201. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 4.
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constitutional right to due process had been violated.202  However, Ne-
braska’s constitution states there is no right to private ownership of
the waters203 and the Eighth Circuit unanimously agreed.204
2. Strong Interest in Quick Administration of Water
There is a strong public interest not only in the proper administra-
tion of the state’s waters but also in their effective ministerial ac-
tion.205  The Department has statutory jurisdiction over all issues
involving water rights.206  Chapter 46 of the Nebraska Revised Stat-
utes supports this jurisdiction “for the distribution of water among dif-
ferent appropriators according to their respective priorities by
administrative officers of the state.”207  These statutes provide for a
“wise public policy” in the interest of “an economical and speedy rem-
edy” to all aggrieved appropriators.208  The state also has an interest
in putting its waters to a beneficial use.209  By proper administration,
therefore, the state avoids conflicts that could arise from having too
many water users rely upon a limited water supply.210
The Supreme Court of Nebraska declared that the state has a duty
“to administer the waters of streams and rivers to prevent waste, to
protect prior appropriators against subsequent appropriators, and to
enforce all adjudicated water rights in accordance with their
terms.”211  Charged with this duty, the state and the Department
clearly have an interest in enforcing the established system of water
administration.  This duty also gives these entities an interest in
quick action, as it is their responsibility to effectively administer the
water.
The Department, so charged by the legislature, has a duty to ad-
minister all unappropriated water in accordance with existing priori-
ties.212  If the Department and its officials fail to enforce the
appropriation system, “it may be compelled to act by mandatory in-
junction or in appropriate circumstances by a timely action of manda-
202. Keating I, No. 7:07CV5011, 2007 WL 2248054, at *1 (D. Neb. Aug. 1, 2007).
203. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 4.
204. Keating II, 562 F.3d 923, 930 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The property right held by appel-
lants is expressly conditioned on the [Department’s] determination of watershed
capacity, and therefore appellants have no legitimate claim to the water . . . .”).
205. State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 163, 168, 292 N.W. 239, 244 (1940).
206. NEB. REV. STAT. § 61-206(1) (Reissue 2003).
207. Cary, 138 Neb. 168, 292 N.W. at 244 (discussing various statutory provisions in
Chapter 46).
208. Id. at 168, 292 N.W. at 244.
209. Id. at 168, 292 N.W. at 244.
210. Id. at 168–69, 292 N.W. at 244.
211. Id. at 169, 292 N.W. at 244.
212. Platte Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Tilley, 142 Neb. 122, 5 N.W.2d 252 (1942).
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mus.”213  Therefore, in order to avoid judicial remand, the
Department has an interest in upholding the established system of
water administration.  Had the Eighth Circuit ruled against the de-
fendants in Keating, the NPPD could have foreseeably sought a writ of
mandamus to require the Department to enforce the district’s senior
priority date over the plaintiffs.214  Consequently, faced with the
threat of suit from both parties, an Eighth Circuit ruling adverse to
the NPPD would not have solved the water administration issues.  On
the contrary, it would only have exacerbated the problem of effective
water administration by forcing Nebraska and the Department to cre-
ate an entirely new system of administration.  Further, the prior ap-
propriation system is favored above the riparian system that was once
in place.215  If future plaintiffs, as those in Bond, are successful and
the Nebraska Supreme Court ignores the Eighth Circuit’s precedent,
Nebraska would be forced to adopt and institute an entirely new sys-
tem for the second time in the state’s history.
3. A New System Would Require Massive State Resources
Despite the decision in Keating, and because of cases such as Bond,
the threat to Nebraska’s water administration system has not yet
passed.  If a court rules that affording due process requires the De-
partment to provide a predeprivation hearing before issuing a closing
notice, it would effectively remove procedural steps that have histori-
cally been available to all water users.  Since the implementation of
the prior appropriation system as a result of the Act of 1895,216 the
legislature has provided procedural remedies for those senior appro-
priators not receiving their allotment of water.217  The legislature has
also charged the Department with the duty to enforce such laws.218  If
predeprivation hearings were required, the state and the Department
would have to overturn over 115 years of developed administration.
In addition to creating an entirely new system, mandatory
predeprivation hearings would create an excessive burden on both the
Department and the state’s judicial system.  There are over 8,000 ap-
propriations to the waters of Nebraska219 and it would be almost im-
possible to effectively administer predeprivation hearings to each one.
To illustrate, focus on the Keating case alone.  A required predepriva-
213. HARNSBERGER & THORSON, supra note 5, at 113 (citing Cary, 138 Neb. 163, 292
N.W. 239, and Platte, 142 Neb. 122, 5 N.W.2d 242).
214. Id.
215. 7 REP. NEB. BD. IRRIGATION  BIENNIAL REP. 11–12 (1907–1908).
216. See supra section II.B.
217. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-203 (Reissue 2010).
218. Cary, 138 Neb. at 168–69, 292 N.W. at 244.
219. As of 2011, there were 8,197 appropriation permits in the State of Nebraska.  Ne-
braska Department of Natural Resources, Surface Water Uses by Water Division
Report (2011).
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tion hearing would mean that the Department would have had to pro-
vide a predeprivation hearing twice, within a five-month period, for
each of the four named plaintiffs.220  Each time, moreover, the hearing
might even come before or after any fluctuation in stream flow about
which the parties were in dispute.  The plaintiffs in Keating are only
from one small, centrally located area around Spencer Dam.221  In es-
sence, it would be an undue burden to require the Department to offer
predeprivation hearings to the multitude of appropriators numerous
times a year.
V. EXCEPTIONS TO PREDEPRIVATION HEARINGS
Due process requires a person to be granted a hearing in order to
contest the deprivation of their property interest.222  However, due
process only requires that a hearing be “granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner,”223 and be “appropriate to the nature of
the case.”224  The Supreme Court of the United States has further es-
tablished that the “formality and procedural requisites for the hearing
can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and
the nature of the subsequent proceedings.”225
A. Boddie v. Connecticut: Countervailing State Interest of
Overriding Significance
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that due process
protects citizens from a State’s intervention or denial of rights.226  In
Boddie v. Connecticut, women on welfare assistance brought suit
against the State of Connecticut, arguing a statute that required citi-
zens to pay a fee prior to filing for divorce was unconstitutional.227
The Court acknowledged the established precedent that due process
requires individuals to be given a “right to be heard.”228  The Court
held, however, that due process is not required if there is a “counter-
vailing state interest of overriding significance.”229
Here the exception in Boddie is directly applicable to the chal-
lenges of the appropriation system because the Department has a
“countervailing state interest of overriding significance” in the effec-
220. Keating III, 713 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854–55 (D. Neb. 2010).
221. Id.
222. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
223. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
224. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 378 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 371.
228. Id. at 377 (quoting Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 417 (1897)).
229. Id.
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tive administration of water.  The effective administration of water
preserves the property values of senior appropriators and encourages
Nebraska citizens and entities to use state waters in the most effective
means possible.  A closing notice, on the other hand, only prevents a
junior appropriator from using water for a short period of time.230  Ne-
braska’s interest in preserving the system of administration, there-
fore, significantly overrode the plaintiffs’ interests in Keating and
should override any future plaintiff’s interest.  While challengers to
the appropriation system are merely seeking water use for a limited
time frame (one or two weeks), defendants such as NPPD and the De-
partment are seeking to preserve their property value—a dollar value
that could potentially extend into the millions.  In essence, challengers
like those in Keating and Bond would usurp the appropriation system,
the interests of the state, and the property interests of appropriators.
Effective water administration is a compelling interest superior to
that of the challengers.  Thus, the Supreme Court has held that due
process, at the very least, requires that deprivation of “property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appro-
priate to the nature of the case.”231  In Keating, the Department did not
completely deprive the plaintiffs of due process, as the State did in
Boddie; the Department always provides a postdeprivation hearing to
any appropriator that requests it.232  It is also important to note that
a postdeprivation hearing is more than sufficient because the Depart-
ment does not deprive an appropriator of a property right in water but
the right to use the water, the demand of which can rapidly change
from day to day.233
B. The Three-Part Inquiry in Mathews v. Eldridge
Subsequent to establishing a “countervailing State interest of over-
riding significance” exception to procedural due process, the Supreme
Court of the United States established a three-part inquiry set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge.234  There, a citizen on Social Security disability
challenged the constitutional validity of procedures established by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.235  The procedures
challenged were those used in determining whether a citizen could
continue to be declared disabled.236  The three-part inquiry set forth
230. The average closing time in Keating was two weeks. Keating III, 713 F. Supp. 2d
849 (D. Neb. 2010).
231. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (emphasis
added).
232. See supra subsection II.E.ii.
233. See supra section II.G.
234. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
235. Id. at 324–25.
236. Id.
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in Mathews provides an analysis that assists in determining the ade-
quacy of the hearing provided.
The first inquiry is whether the private interest of the plaintiff has
been adversely affected by some governmental action.237  It takes into
account the type of property interest the plaintiff has, as well as the
magnitude to which it has been affected.238  The second inquiry is to
determine if there is a risk of erroneous deprivation of the private in-
terest and the effectiveness that any procedural safeguards might
have on preventing error.239  The final part of the inquiry is to analyze
the government’s interest and consider economic and “administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.”240
The plaintiffs in Keating pleaded that the closing notices issued by
the Department harmed a private interest held in water use per-
mits.241  However, the private interest in water use permits is minis-
cule, as Nebraska case law has established that there is no direct
property right to the waters specified in an appropriation, only to the
use of such waters.242  Moreover, there is very little chance of errone-
ous deprivation because the Department can identify each individual
appropriator through the permit system.243  A postdeprivation hear-
ing is far more accurate due to the pressures associated with a
predeprivation hearing’s inherent time constraints.  A postdeprivation
hearing, on the other hand, has no time restrictions since there pre-
sumably would not be a pressing need for water.  Thus, it would be
better able to include all evidence necessary and allow parties ample
time to prepare.
Lastly, under the final prong of the Mathews analysis, the Depart-
ment’s interest in preserving the prior appropriation system substan-
tially outweighs the interests of any potential challengers.  The
economic and administrative burdens in providing “additional or sub-
stitute procedures” would be, at best, excessive.  The entire appropria-
tion system is established on the basis that closing notices must be
issued immediately in the interest of preserving the appropriation sys-
tem and the property values of other appropriators, and the Depart-
ment provides a postdeprivation hearing for any junior appropriator
that desires one.244  To require the Department to rework the entire
appropriation system would certainly impose undue economic and ad-
237. Id. at 334–35.
238. Id. at 341.
239. Id. at 334–35.
240. Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263–71 (1970)).
241. Keating I, No. 7:07CV5011, 2007 WL 2248054 (D. Neb. Aug. 1, 2007).
242. See supra subsection II.G.ii.
243. See supra section II.C.
244. See supra section II.E.
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ministrative burdens, which would defeat the final prong of the Ma-
thews inquiry.
There are few recognized exceptions to providing a predeprivation
hearing.  The most pertinent one to this discussion is that predepriva-
tion hearings are not be required in situations where a state’s interest
must be protected through quick and effective administration.245  The
Supreme Court has found “quick action” necessary—and thus a
predeprivation hearing unnecessary—in situations such as the de-
struction of contaminated food246 and the suspension of a driver’s li-
cense as a result of refusing to submit to a breathalyzer.247  Like those
cases, the preservation of property values, the prior appropriation sys-
tem, and compliance with interstate compacts require that the De-
partment take quick action in issuing closing notices to junior
appropriators.
C. Little Likelihood of Serious Loss
In addition to the noted exceptions, due process does not demand a
predeprivation hearing “where the potential length or severity of the
deprivation does not indicate a likelihood of serious loss and where the
procedures underlying the decision to act are sufficiently reliable to
minimize the risk of erroneous determination.”248  This exception di-
rectly applies to the facts in Keating, and would likely apply to any
future challenges to the appropriation system.  The closing notices is-
sued to the plaintiffs in Keating were in place for a month at most.249
A closing notice’s length of time issued does not “indicate a likelihood
of serious loss” because the plaintiffs would not be without water for a
significant amount of time, and would not plead substantial damages.
Further, “the issuance of Closing Notices does not impact the property
right bestowed by the permit to use the surface water.”250  If there is
no property right affected, then there can be no likelihood of serious
loss.
D. Nebraska’s Appropriation System is Not Violative of Due
Process
Nebraska’s system of water administration does not violate due
process. “If the statute, regulation, or contract in issue vests in the
state significant discretion over the continued conferral of that bene-
fit, it will be the rare case that the recipient will be able to establish
245. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347–49.
246. N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
247. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
248. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978).
249. Keating III, 713 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854–55 (D. Neb. 2010).
250. Keating IV, 660 F.3d 1014, 1018 (8th Cir. 2011).
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an entitlement to that benefit.”251  The Department had adopted the
regulations at issue in Keating for the purpose of administering
water.252  The statutes upon which the Department relied when en-
forcing the prior appropriation system were also at issue.253  The leg-
islature has given the Department authority to administer the entire
water system.254  According to the Second Circuit, because these regu-
lations and statutes vest discretion in the state, it is likely that the
appropriation system will be upheld.255
Additionally, due process is “a flexible concept” which “calls only
for such procedural protection as the particular situation de-
mands.”256  Water administration must, by nature, be very flexible as
well.  Stream flow is by nature uncontrollable, as is the very concept of
rain, precipitation, evaporation, and seepage, and the Department
cannot be charged with controlling waters which flow through Ne-
braska’s streams.  As such, the system of water administration is a
flexible concept, and the due process it provides conforms to the na-
ture of the system.
The Nebraska Legislature requires only that the Department
“make proper arrangements for the determination of priorities.”257  It
does not charge it with a specific procedure for so doing.  As such, the
Eighth Circuit correctly ruled that the Department’s actions were not
violative of due process.258  It wisely decided not to overrule its prior
decision that due process is whatever “the particular situation de-
mands.”259  Through its own experience of water administration, the
Department has determined the availability of postdeprivation reme-
dies most effectively affords due process.  For this reason, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision,260 and future challeng-
ers, like those in Bond, are unlikely to be successful.
One may argue that, regardless of the established fluidity of due
process, a predeprivation hearing is necessary to satisfy due process
requirements.  In other words, the availability of postdeprivation rem-
edies is not a defense to the denial of procedural due process where
251. Kelly Kare, Ltd. v. O’Rourke, 930 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Plaza Health
Labs., Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1989), and RR Vill. Ass’n v.
Denver Sewer Corp., 826 F.2d 1197, 1201 (2d Cir. 1987)).
252. Keating III, 713 F. Supp. 2d 849.
253. Sections 46-203 to 46-226 govern water administration through the appropriation
system. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-203 to 46-226 (Reissue 2010).
254. Id. § 46-226; see also Koch v. Aupperle, 274 Neb. 52, 737 N.W.2d 869 (2007) (ex-
plaining that the Department has statutory authority to determine priorities of
right to use the state’s public surface waters).
255. Kelly Kare, 930 F.2d at 175.
256. Moore v. Warwick Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 29, 794 F.2d 322, 327 (8th Cir. 1986).
257. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-226(1).
258. Keating IV, 660 F.3d 1014, 1018 (8th Cir. 2011).
259. Moore, 794 F.2d at 327.
260. Keating IV, 660 F.3d at 1019.
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predeprivation process is practicable.261  But, predeprivation hearings
are severely impracticable.262  There are far too many water appropri-
ations in the state for the Department to effectively afford a
predeprivation hearing every time a closing notice is issued.  The bur-
den it would create on the Department and the judicial system ren-
ders a predeprivation hearing impracticable.  Thus, postdeprivation
hearings must necessarily satisfy due process.263
VI. ENTITLEMENT, EXPECTATION, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
In Keating, the plaintiffs claimed a property interest in their water
use permits that would require a predeprivation hearing before the
issuance of a closing notice.264  The Second Circuit has ruled that in
order “to claim a protected property interest in a particular adminis-
trative benefit or measure, an individual must have ‘a legitimate
claim of entitlement’ in receiving the benefit or measure, not merely ‘a
unilateral expectation’ in a desired administrative outcome.”265  A
party possesses an “entitlement” if an administrative procedure re-
quires a certain outcome.266  Therefore, there are only expectations in
a statute as it is written.  Plaintiffs have no cause of action when a
statute is simply enforced as written; a statutory cause of action only
exists if the statute is not enforced properly.  Nebraska’s system of
water administration does not, however, require that any appropria-
tor receive water; it only requires that appropriators be given a permit
to divert water subject to the laws of the state.267  The plaintiffs in
Keating, or in similar suits challenging the appropriation system, dis-
played “a unilateral expectation” that the administration of water will
always result in the receipt of sufficient water for their desired uses.
In other words, similar to the rights held by the plaintiffs in Sealed,268
appropriators are not entitled to any outcome beyond possession of an
appropriation.  Suits challenging the appropriation system are merely
a result of disappointed “unilateral expectation[s],” and should not,
therefore, be entertained by the courts.
While it may be argued that plaintiffs such as Keating and Bond
rely on appropriated water for their very livelihood, courts have ruled
that a claim of livelihood is not enough to establish a property
right.269  In Kelly Kare, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the county from
261. Moore, 794 F.2d at 328.
262. See supra section IV.D.
263. Moore, 794 F.2d at 328.
264. Keating III, 713 F. Supp. 2d 849, 855 (D. Neb. 2010).
265. Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
266. Id.
267. 457 NEB. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 18, § 004 (2005).
268. Sealed, 332 F.3d 51.
269. Kelly Kare, Ltd. v. O’Rourke, 930 F.2d 170, 174–76 (2d Cir. 1991).
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terminating their Medicaid reimbursement contract.270  They argued
that the benefit of the reimbursement contract was important to their
business (i.e., livelihood), and thus, the county was depriving them of
a property right.271  The Second Circuit ruled that a “property interest
does not exist solely because of the importance of the benefit to the
recipient.”272  Thus, challengers to the appropriation system cannot
argue that their unencumbered use of water is a property right that
cannot be infringed upon simply because water is important to their
livelihood.  That argument is also not enough for a plaintiff’s expecta-
tion “of continued receipt of the benefit sufficient to establish a prop-
erty interest.”273  In order for plaintiffs to establish a property interest
in the actual water, they must demonstrate a “legitimate claim of enti-
tlement,”274 which is clearly a weak, if not wholly irrelevant,
argument.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit correctly held that the plaintiffs in Keating did
not suffer a due process violation through the denial of a postdepriva-
tion hearing.  While it is clear that the prior appropriation system will
continue to come under attack, it is equally clear that the system
should continue to be upheld by the courts, as it was in Keating.  As
established by over one hundred years of Nebraska case law, appropri-
ators hold no property right to the waters.  Appropriators have a prop-
erty right in their seniority and in the use of the water therein.  As
such, appropriators cannot claim, as the plaintiffs in Keating and
Bond attempted, that they have a right to the physical water specified
in their permit.
The state, moreover, has a strong interest in the speedy adminis-
tration of its waters.  This interest is best accomplished by
postdeprivation hearings.  Requiring a predeprivation hearing would
severely retard the administration of water and significantly injure
senior appropriators’ rights.  There is an inherent value in proper se-
nior appropriation and property values which would be significantly
depreciated if seniority is rendered useless.  Furthermore, if future
challengers successfully obtain a judgment that requires predepriva-
tion hearings, Nebraska would be forced to create and implement an
entirely new system.
Additionally, the Department’s system satisfies the exceptions to
predeprivation hearing requirements the Supreme Court has estab-
lished.  First, the state’s interests outweigh the interests of junior ap-
270. Id. at 173.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 175.
273. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
274. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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propriators.275  Second, the postdeprivation hearings are appropriate
to the effective administration of the water.276  Third, the system sat-
isfies the Mathews three-part inquiry.277  Lastly, challengers claiming
a property right to the water cannot claim that they have lost an ex-
pectation of that property right.278  Any expectation is purely unilat-
eral.279  Thus, they are not entitled to due process.
Courts should uphold the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Keating IV,
because it correctly held that a postdeprivation hearing was sufficient
to provide the plaintiffs with their due process rights.  Requiring a
predeprivation hearing before a closing notice can be issued would de-
stroy the value of senior appropriations and render the State of Ne-
braska’s entire appropriation system useless.  While water may be for
fighting over, challengers to the system do not have a place in the
fight.  Instead, they are bystanders claiming to have a right to the
center of the ring.
275. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
276. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318–19 (1950).
277. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.319 (1976).
278. Id. at 341–43.
279. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
